INTRODUCTION
The "deadliest enemies" motif is the foundation of the current model of tribal-state relations, or what I will call the "deadliest enemies model" of tribal-state relations.
3 It derives from an age-old, intergenerational enmity between the people of Indian communities and the non-Indians who live on or near Indian Country. This model of relations arose out of the often violent conflict over limited resources between Indians and non-Indians during the westward migration of the American nation in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Justice Miller used this language in United States v. Kagama as a means to offer a policy justification for the extension of federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country. 4 In this context, because Indians were so weakened and TULSA LAW RE VIEW dependent on the federal government-and because the local non-Indians and the states were so overwhelmingly hostile to tribal interests-federal legislation to extend federal criminal jurisdiction into Indian Country was necessary to protect tribal communities. Now-Chief Justice Roberts, representing the State of Alaska in a case in the late 1990s, utilized the same phrasing in asserting that Indians on the continental United States were just as deadly to the states and their citizens. 5 This model of mutual animosity forms the backbone of tribal-state relations to this day. In general, state laws and regulations do not have effect inside of Indian Country absent Congressional authorization.
6
But American Indian law is transforming. The political relationship between the United States and Indian tribes remains, 7 but a new and more dynamic relationship between states and Indian tribes is growing. States and Indian tribes are beginning to smooth over the rough edges of federal Indian law-jurisdictional confusion, historical animosity between states and Indian tribes, competition between sovereigns for tax revenue, economic development opportunities, and regulatory authority-through cooperative agreements. 8 In effect, a new political relationship is springing up all over the nation between states, local units of government, and Indian tribes. One template for these new arrangements is the Class III compacting process created in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 9 As a result of the relative success of the cooperation between gaming tribes and states, tribal-state cooperation and agreement is growing. 10 Many states now recognize Indian tribes as de facto political sovereigns, often in the form of a statement of policy whereby the state agrees to engage Indian tribes in a government-togovernment relationship mirroring federal policy. The tribal-federal political relationship remains, but more and more tribal-state political relationships form every year, requiring an alternative legal theory authorizing federal and state legislation toward Indian tribes. The federal common law still offers a threat to these new relationships by keeping the authority of tribes and states to interact in a legal gray area.ll This Essay argues two points. First, Indian tribes and states must move away from the "deadliest enemies" model of tribal-state relations. Second, state action that involves Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945) ).
7. See generally Cohen's Handbook, supra n. 6, at § § 5.04[31-[4] (describing the treaty and trust relationship of the United States to Indian tribes); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status oflndian Tribes, 82 St. John's L. Rev. 153 (2008) .
8. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, 53 Fed. Law. 38, 38 (2006 Review, Vol. 43 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 5 http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss1/5 or even favors Indian tribes and Indian people is constitutionally viable under federal common law, so long as it does not discriminate against tribal interests.
II. THE TRIBAL-FEDERAL POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP
The Constitution deals with Indian tribes in two places. First, the Indian Commerce Clause provides that Congress holds exclusive authority to deal with Indian commerce, preempting state authority in the area.
12 Indians also are mentioned in the "Indians Not Taxed" Clause, whereby Indians who are not citizens cannot be counted for purposes of political apportionment.
13
The way these two provisions should be understood is to realize that the Founders accepted two different kinds of Indian tribes. The first kind of tribe was located outside the territorial boundaries of the United States. The second kind of tribe was exterminated or abandoned, no longer recognized as a distinct political entity. The Indian Commerce Clause and the "Indians Not Taxed" Clause applied to the first kind of Indian tribes. Indians who could be "taxed" applied to the second kind. Hence, the President continued to negotiate treaties with Indian tribes and Congress enacted the Trade and Intercourse Acts, 14 prohibiting anyone (including states) from interfering in Indian affairs. Assimilated Indians who abandoned their tribal relations could become citizens (in theory).
15
But there was a third kind of tribe that the Founders did not incorporate into the Constitutional structure-and that is the only kind of tribe there is in the modem eraIndian tribes located within the exterior boundaries of the United States. There are more than 560 federally recognized tribes located within the United States. 16 Of course, the Founders were aware of these tribes. In some instances, they even promised statehood to them via the treaty process.
1 7 And in Worcester v. Georgia, 18 Chief Justice Marshall 12. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996) .
If anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from the fact that the States still exercise some authority over interstate trade but have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes. Id.; Co. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. St., 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985) ; Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 2007 ) (en banc); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297 , 1307 -08 (W.D.N.Y. 1983 ; Mohegan Tribe v. St. of Conn., 528 F. Supp. 1359 , 1368 -69 (D. Conn. 1982 ) (quoting Natl. League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) § § 4101-4243 (2000 § § 4101-4243 ( & Supp. 2002 (regulating Native American housing assistance and self-determination).
24. See generally e.g. 25 U.S.C. § § 461-494 (2000 § § 461-494 ( & Supp. 2002 (regulating protection of Indians and conservation of resources); 25 U.S.C. § § 2701-2721 (2000) Review, Vol. 43 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 5 http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss1/5
RETIRING THE "DEADLIEST ENEMIES" MODEL
The Framers of the Constitution wanted to correct that defect by excluding states (and individuals) from dealing with Indian tribes and Indian people.
27 While in hindsight the
Indian Commerce Clause appears to fail in this regard (given its plain language), 2 8 it is clear that the Founders understood the Clause and the structure of the Constitution as a whole to strip states and individuals of the authority to deal in Indian affairs. 29 The first Congress' enactment of the Trade and Intercourse Acts, prohibiting all forms of trade and interaction between Indians and others without federal consent, is strong evidence of the intent to keep states away from Indian tribes.
30
Much of the early history of federal Indian law and policy is framed by the designation of states as the "deadliest enemies" of Indians and Indian tribes. States and their constituents were in a never-ending quest to take Indian lands and resources and, in some circumstances, to eliminate Indians and Indian tribes.
3 1 The State of Georgia's legal and political assault on the Cherokee Nation in the 1820s and 1830s is indicative of the strength of vicious political will used by states attempting to rid themselves of the "Indian Problem." 32 The eastern states continued to acquire Indian lands long after the congressional ban and began to pay the legal price almost two centuries later. 33 Other states and local units of government, with the acquiescence and sometimes assistance of in the articles of Confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there restrained to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State within its own limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is not yet settled; and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the Federal Councils. And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible.
Id.
27 In sum, the Nation operates the Nation Station in order to provide a service for patrons at its casino without, in any way, seeking to attract bargain hunters on the lookout for cheap gas. Kansas' collection of its tax on fuel destined for the Nation Station will effectively nullify the Nation's tax, which funds critical reservation road-building programs, endeavors not aided by state funds. I resist that unbalanced judgment. Id; Br. for Respt. at 2, Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95.
The state tax thus interferes directly with a core attribute of tribal sovereignty--the Tribe's power to impose a fuel tax to finance the construction and maintenance of reservation roads and bridges. The State's studied ignorance of the Tribe's sovereign interest in taxation to support its infrastructure is ironic at best, as the power to tax is the very attribute of its own sovereignty that the State purports to vindicate. The States, having within their chartered limits different portions of territory covered by Indians, ceded that territory, generally, to the United States, on conditions expressed in their deeds of cession, which demonstrate the opinion, that they ceded the soil as well as jurisdiction, and that in doing so, they granted a productive fund to the government of the Union. The lands in controversy lay within the chartered limits of Virginia, and were ceded with the whole country northwest of the river Ohio. This grant contained reservations and stipulations, which could only be made by the owners of the soil; and concluded with a stipulation, that "all the lands in the ceded territory, not reserved, should be considered as a common fund, for the use and benefit of such of the United States as have become, or shall become, members of the confederation," &c. "according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever." As such, the potential for literal violence between the states and the tribes is relatively low. The lone assumption of the five that retains a significant value is the assumption that the best way to deal with Indian tribes is through trade. However, though much of federal Indian policy does focus on economic development, 5 1 much more of modem federal Indian policy is focused (properly) on the development of Indian tribes as viable and stable political entities.
Id. (emphasis added).
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52
The United States is no longer actively seeking to assimilate Indian people through the erosion of their governments and cultures as a matter of national policy. That policy already failed.
Given the incorrectness of the Framers' assumptions about Indian affairs, the "deadliest enemies" model of tribal-state relations makes no sense. And, like large portions of the rest of the Constitution, the Constitution's treatment of Indian tribes and Indian people has not aged very well at all. The Framers' original intent as it relates to Indian tribes is so far removed from modem reality that it would be laughable if the history connecting the Framers to the modem world were not so tragic and horrifying.
What makes this a problem for modem tribal-state relations is that the federal common law that arose from the Constitution's limited treatment of Indian tribes and Indian people has deviated from both the intent of the Framers and from the modem, onthe-ground realities of Indian affairs. The Supreme Court 19th century view that Indian tribes would soon disappear was replaced by a more enlightened, mid-20th century view articulated in the original Handbook of Federal Indian Law that tribal sovereignty was constitutionally viable and legitimate. 53 But in order to marry the two deviating courses 49. See Cohen's Handbook, supra n. 6, at 37-41. 50. See Pub. L. No. 68-175, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, 253 (1924) Some of these disputes can be ferocious, but few of them lead to violence.
In the modem era, it no longer appears to be the goal or policy of state governments to eliminate Indian tribes and Indian people. The "Indian Problem" is now political and legal.
IV. THE NEW TRIBAL-STATE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP
Spurred by developments in national Indian policy and a few Supreme Court decisions, 6 1 states and tribes began to talk in earnest in the 1990s. There had been a few cooperative agreements between Indian tribes and states as far back as the 1970s (and perhaps earlier), 62 but these agreements were few and subject to changing political winds, not to mention the old animus between the parties. A sort of legal stalemate ensued in the 1990s between Indian tribes and states. A shorthand way to describe the equation was that the tribes had casino gaming, 63 treaty rights, 64 and all but exclusive authority over tribal members in Indian Country, 65 while the states had enough common law authority over nonmembers inside of Indian Country to interfere with tribal affairs.
66
While in the 1960s and 1970s, Indian affairs litigation involved the question of whether Indian tribes would survive as political entities in the United States (a question answered roundly in the affirmative), 67 in the 1980s and 1990s, Indian affairs litigation involved jurisdictional limits and smaller and smaller amounts of money. 68 The costs of litigation began to overwhelm the stakes. In such circumstances, negotiation is the proper tool.
The foundational principle that excludes states from Indian affairs is no longer necessary, nor is it viable. The political and social circumstances justifying exclusive federal authority in Indian affairs have changed. States and their subdivisions (in general) no longer act to destroy Indian tribes. And the federal government, in a slow but deliberate fashion, is getting out of the Indian business. 69 Congress delegates more and more of its exclusive Indian affairs authority to tribes and, to a lesser extent, states. Two important modem statutes, the Indian Child Welfare Act 70 and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 7 1 authorize and even mandate cooperation between Indian tribes and states.
By the 1980s, many Indian tribes and states began to realize that the future of tribal-state relations would be negotiation and agreement. 72 Many states now authorize the negotiation and execution of cooperative agreements with Indian tribes. 73 Arizona authorizes the Arizona State Boxing Commission to enter into intergovernmental agreements with Indian tribes to provide for the regulation of boxing in Indian Country;
74 California authorizes agreements to create economic development opportunities with Indian tribes; 75 Minnesota authorizes the creation of tribal-state law enforcement cooperative agreements; 76 and Nebraska authorizes its governor to negotiate and execute tax agreements with Indian tribes located within the state. Assuming tribal-state relations continue to develop (and it is most likely they will and in more ways than any one commentator can anticipate), one problem remainsfederal Indian law. One of the foundational principles of federal Indian law as articulated in the original and most influential Handbook of Federal Indian Law is that the states and the tribes may not mix without the express authority of Congress." This is the legal doctrine underlying the "deadliest enemies" model of tribal-state relations. This model takes the form of various federal statutes and their implementing regulations, some treaty provisions, and federal common law, as discussed above.
The remnants of ancient federal Indian policy still codified in several places in the United States Code imply that tribes and states have little or no authority to execute intergovernmental agreements. The Trade and Intercourse Act as amended and finally granted permanence by Congress in 1834 may stand as an implied political barrier to tribal-state relations. 84 Other provisions limiting tribal authority to alienate or mortgage lands or refusing to recognize external tribal sovereignty tend to imply a lack of tribal authority to execute intergovernmental agreements with states. 85 However, another critical Indian law statute, known as Section 81, has been amended in recent years to create additional (and perhaps sufficient) capacity for tribes to negotiate and execute a wide variety of agreements, even agreements that allow for the collateralization of Indian trust lands for a limited period of years.
86
In addition to statutory implications, the federal common law recognizes barriers to tribal-state cooperation as well. The Supreme Court's decision in Kennerly v. District Court 87 held that tribes could not divest themselves of the entirety of their jurisdiction to states without the express consent of Congress.
88
In the case of modem intergovernmental agreements, Indian tribes are not conceding jurisdiction over their entire territories to states-they are settling questions of jurisdictional dispute with the states by creating certainty through agreement where federal Indian law offers nothing more than gray areas.
8 9 In the case of the Michigan tribal-state tax agreements, the signatory tribes actually extended their jurisdiction outside of the reservation boundaries to include benefits for tribal members living in Traverse City, Charlevoix, 9 1 or St.
Joseph. 92 Moreover, a closer understanding of Kennerly's context confirms that its underlying basis of the opinion was a concern that states were continuing to take 84. See25U.S.C. § 177. 85. Prior to 2000, for example, 25 U.S.C. § 81 read: No agreement shall be made by any person with any tribe of Indians, or individual Indians not citizens of the United States, for the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value, in present or in prospective, or for the granting or procuring any privilege to him, or any other person in consideration of services for said Indians relative to their lands, or to any claims growing out of, or in reference to, annuities, installments, or other moneys, claims, demands, or thing, under laws or treaties with the United States, or official acts of any officers thereof, or in any way connected with or due from the United States ....
Id.
86 These are serious concerns not to be taken lightly, but they make and rely upon the same assumptions about Indian affairs that the Founders did. As a result, these concerns can be assuaged with a reconsideration of what federal Indian law means in the modem era. The rub in the constitutional argument is this: "protect[ion of] federal supremacy in the negotiation of Indian agreements affecting sovereignty .... ,9 But this begs the question of what federal interests are at stake when a tribe and a state enter into an agreement on jurisdiction or other question involving sovereignty. Recall that the federal government's interests in 1789 were substantial (national security, national revenue sources, and so on), but those interests have faded in this context. Remember further that the plain text of the Indian Commerce Clause does not preclude tribal-state agreements-and neither does any federal statute expressly prohibit these agreements. The only way, then, that tribal-state intergovernmental agreements would be struck down as violative of the Constitution would be as a matter of common law. 99 In other words, the very same case that articulated the "deadliest enemies" model of tribal-state relations in the first instance-United States v. Kagamal°°-would be the centerpiece of the common law assault on the authority of states (and to a lesser extent, tribes) to enter into these agreements. Kagama's view of Indian tribes and the trust relationship between tribes and the United States is no longer the reality of Indian affairs, if it ever was. Indian tribes are heading in a direction toward self-governance, with their remaining "dependence" on the federal government being more and more confined to international relations and security from foreign threats. A far better view-one that will replace the current form of the trust relationshipis to view states as a legitimate player in Indian affairs. So long as the federal-tribal political relationship is not interrupted or affected in a negative manner, what harm does it do to legitimize tribal-state agreements? Relationships between states and tribes are no longer based in violence and genocidal racism. Like any arms-length transaction between commercial partners or sovereigns, modern state and tribal parties will use the legal process to enforce rights and duties. Tribal-state agreements are exercises of sovereignty-and nothing in the Constitution should preclude them.
VI. CONCLUSION
As co-chair of the 2006 Federal Bar Association's Annual Indian Law Conference, I drafted a summary of the goals of that year's conference (with the assistance of Allie Greenleaf Maldonado, Gabe Galanda, and Cheryl Fairbanks, the other co-chairs), a conference we titled, "Active Sovereignty in the 21st Century." These words are very appropriate in concluding this brief Essay:
Tribal leaders and advocates have long known, understood, and even memorized Felix Cohen's classic statement of tribal sovereignty appearing on page 122 of the original Handbook of Federal Indian Law. The powers vested in Indian tribes are inherent powers of a limited sovereignty that has never been extinguished. In the early years of the 21st century, after years of struggle to prevent further extinguishment of those powers, it is time to move away from focusing on the "limits" of sovereignty and examine how Indian tribes can activate those inherent, but often latent, powers that will expand and solidify tribal sovereignty. Indians and Indian tribes live and learn in the real world, on the ground, and in daily interactions with Indians and non-Indian community members; federal, state, and local governments and government officials; and Indian and non-Indians businesses.
This conference invites tribal leaders and advocates to look inward and to strengthen the core inherent sovereignty. We believe that a strong inner foundation will help build a greater capacity to face opposition. 101
The title of that conference derived from Justice Breyer's recent book, Active
